Forge

[0.8.0] — 2026-06-27

First-class authentication across all proxy modes and backends. forge now forwards exactly one credential to the backend — a static --backend-api-key or a single inbound auth header — relocating it across protocols (x-api-key ↔ Authorization: Bearer) when the frontend and backend differ. Gated OpenAI-compatible backends (LM Studio, hosted vLLM, service accounts) work without monkey-patching. Closes #119.

Added

• --backend-api-key / FORGE_BACKEND_API_KEY — a static credential forge sends to the backend in its native auth slot (LM Studio, hosted providers, service accounts — the case where the caller sends nothing). Baked into the backend client at startup and relocated to the backend's protocol slot. When set, an inbound auth header is refused as a second credential.
• Cross-protocol credential relocation — an inbound x-api-key ↔ Authorization: Bearer is rewritten to the backend's protocol when frontend and backend differ (the SSO/forwarded-token case). Frontend protocol is by path (/v1/chat/completions = openai, /v1/messages = anthropic); backend by --backend-protocol. See the auth section in Backend Setup.
• Deferred backend discovery for gated external backends. The context-length / served-model-name probe (llama.cpp /props, vLLM /v1/models) now runs on the first request, authenticated by that request's credential, instead of unauthenticated at startup — which previously 401'd and crashed boot against a gated backend. Managed mode and the Anthropic external path are unaffected. New LLMClient.discover_backend_metadata(extra_headers); vLLM collapses its two /v1/models round-trips into one.

Changed

• BREAKING — credential handling for auth-required backends. This only affects backends that require auth. Ungated local backends are unchanged — leave --backend-api-key unset and send no auth header, exactly as before; zero credentials is the normal local path and still works. What changed: when a backend does require a credential, a request carrying zero now fails loud (401) instead of sending an empty/garbage header that produced an opaque downstream error; and two credentials at once (static + inbound, or two inbound auth headers) are refused with 400 rather than one silently winning. Migration: nothing to do for local/ungated backends. For gated backends, supply exactly one credential — set --backend-api-key (or FORGE_BACKEND_API_KEY), or forward an inbound auth header, not both.
• Removed the silent extra_headers-overrides-api_key merge. A per-call auth header in extra_headers no longer shadows a client's configured api_key; that combination is now a two-credential conflict (400). Migration: pass the credential one way only. (Undocumented prior behavior, unlikely to be relied on.)