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vTOFV-2.0 Security

This release includes 10 security fixes for security teams reviewing exposed deployments.

✓ No known CVEs patched
Read the diff → Tool health → What is this tool? →
This release patches 10 known CVEs

Topics

ack-diagram air-gapped break-glass browser-based disaster-recovery documentation
+12 more
encrypted homelab-network html5 network-diagram network-topology offline-first-single-file oidc self self-hosted sso web-crypto zero-dependency

Affected surfaces

auth rbac

Summary

AI summary

Updates https://multiverse.therecanonlybe.one/s/0388e827-e374-435a-bea1-8702db394e73, https://multiverse.therecanonlybe.one/, and https://therecanonlybe.one/theonefile_verse/demo-admin.html across a mixed release.

Full changelog

6/6/26 Theonefile_verse 2.0.0 : That 2.0 glow

  • Thank you to everyone who has/will use. Thank you to everyone who has helped in every way
  • Security changes for 2.0

    • WebSocket session tokens are now required by default. A connection no longer joins the room until it has authenticated.
    • Set REQUIRE_WS_TOKEN=false only for trusted local testing.
    • NOTE: The encryption key is now written to a protected key file instead of the database. Any key already in the database is moved to the file on first start and removed from the database. ENCRYPTION_KEY still overrides, and production mode still requires it.
    • X Forwarded For is ignored unless a reverse proxy is configured. The real socket address is used by default, so client IP and rate limit identity can no longer be spoofed on a directly exposed instance. Set TRUSTED_PROXY_COUNT or TRUSTED_PROXIES behind a proxy.
  • Server Hardening

    • Added server side request protection on the probe endpoints.
    • Probes to loopback, link local metadata (169.254.0.0/16), 0.0.0.0, broadcast, and localhost names are rejected. Private range monitoring of your own network still works.
    • Probe targets given as a hostname are resolved and checks against the block above.
    • Account linking through single sign on now requires the provider verified email to match the account email.
    • OIDC discovery and token endpoints must use https (loopback allowed for local testing).
    • Two factor codes and backup codes are now compared in constant time.
    • The mailer forces certificate verification in production even if insecure TLS was requested.
    • The OIDC debug log should be off in production.
    • WebSockets are rate limited per user in addition to per connection.
    • Email template hardening.
    • Fixed an issue where Redis had repeated error logging when no Redis is configured.
    • Added a security check to custom theonefile_networkening.html templates
  • Client Hardening

    • Bundled DOMPurify locally.
  • Performance

    • Tuned SQLite for the collaboration workload (WAL with synchronous NORMAL, a busy timeout, a larger cache, and memory mapped reads) for faster writes and no lock contention under concurrent edits.
    • Static scripts and styles are now served gzip compressed with an ETag, so a returning browser revalidates and gets a small 304 instead of re downloading the client each visit.
  • Engineering Maturity

    • Added as many security checks as I could think of. If you have more, PR is welcome.
    • Added a continuous workflow that runs type checking, lint, tests, plus CodeQL and a Trivy scan.

Breaking Changes

  • WebSocket connections must provide a session token by default; unauthenticated joins are rejected unless REQUIRE_WS_TOKEN is explicitly set to false for local testing.
  • Encryption key storage changed: keys are now written to a protected file on first start, moved from the database and removed there; ENCRYPTION_KEY env var still overrides.

Security Fixes

  • WebSocket session token enforcement prevents unauthenticated room joins (default REQUIRE_WS_TOKEN=true).
  • Encryption key migration to a protected file eliminates database‑stored keys, reducing exposure risk.
  • X-Forwarded-For is ignored unless reverse proxy configured; real socket address used for IP/rate‑limit identity, preventing spoofing.
  • Server‑side request protection blocks loopback, link‑local (169.254.0.0/16), 0.0.0.0, broadcast and localhost probe targets while preserving private‑range monitoring.
  • OIDC discovery and token endpoints now require HTTPS (loopback allowed for local testing).
  • Two‑factor and backup codes compared in constant time to mitigate timing attacks.
  • Mailer enforces certificate verification in production even if insecure TLS was requested.
  • WebSocket connections rate limited per user in addition to per connection.
  • Email template hardening implemented.
  • Custom theonefile_networkening.html templates now include a security check.

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Beta — feedback welcome: [email protected]