Hookwarden

Minor Changes

• 46c2a97: Add the n8n agentic-callback ruleset. The engine gains a workflow-JSON adapter that ingests *.workflow.json files and n8n community custom-nodes (package.json#n8n.nodes, INodeType/IWebhookFunctions sources), synthesizing handler models from n8n trigger/webhook nodes. A new n8n rule pack detects unverified-body agent/tool sinks (VAS/BYP on getBodyData(), $json, items[0].json reaching agent-tool calls) while staying silent on mitigated, signature-verified shapes. The hookwarden CLI now scans n8n projects end-to-end (scan surfaces n8n findings and malformed-workflow parse errors).

• 056ba21: Add queue-handler + edge-runtime reachability overlays and the first asymmetric (Ed25519) provider.

  • REACH-01 — queue-handler reachability: a handler that enqueues the raw body via bullmq / SQS / inngest / Kafka and has a verifying consumer of that queue reachable now resolves to manual-review instead of not-verified (the engine can't prove same-payload verification across the queue boundary, so it never claims verified). A queue enqueue with no verifying consumer stays not-verified.
  • REACH-02 — edge-runtime detection: webhook handlers on Cloudflare Workers (export default { fetch }), Vercel Edge (runtime: 'edge'), and Deno (Deno.serve) are now detected (Next.js App Router was already covered), so the HMAC-over-raw-body rules evaluate them instead of missing or mis-flagging. The full rule pack's applies_to now includes cloudflare-workers / vercel-edge / deno.
  • DISCORD-01 — Ed25519 provider: Discord interactions are the first asymmetric provider (signature_scheme: ed25519, verified against the app public key). The rule recognizes verifyKey (discord-interactions-js), nacl.sign.detached.verify (tweetnacl), nacl.signing.VerifyKey(...).verify(...) (PyNaCl), and sodium_crypto_sign_verify_detached (PHP) as verified; a Discord handler with no Ed25519 verification is not-verified. Discord interaction paths are now detected.

  Engine purity preserved; existing HMAC providers untouched.

• c10427a: v0.8 launch — webhook integrity, from first line to final audit.

  This is the stable v0.8 cut of the CLI + engine + rules cluster. It rolls up the
  v0.8 milestone surface: the n8n agentic-callback ruleset (detecting unverified
  agent/tool webhook sinks, shipped after the Cisco Talos n8n abuse report), the
  Anthropic Agent SDK tool-callback ruleset, and the compliance_mappings schema
  (SOC 2 + ISO 27001 + EU AI Act Annex III + NIST AI RMF) surfaced in
  hookwarden --version --verbose, with the v1.1 evidence pack carrying the EU AI
  Act Annex III high-risk classification and an embedded offline-verifiable
  signing key.

  The MCP server shipped earlier in the v0.8 cycle and versions independently of
  this fixed cluster, so it is intentionally not part of this changeset.

Patch Changes

• 8f8c131: Real-app correctness + scan-robustness + terminal-UX fixes (found auditing dub / cal.com / documenso):

  • engine: req.text() / req.arrayBuffer() now count as raw-body access. The raw-body evidence
    detector recognized express.raw, req.body, php://input, etc. but not the Web Fetch API reads
    used by Next.js App Router / Remix / Hono — exactly the pattern Stripe's docs prescribe
    (const buf = await req.text(); stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(buf, sig, secret)). Correctly-verified
    App Router webhooks were flagged stripe/raw-body-misuse — a false-positive critical on textbook
    code. Now recognized (incl. .clone()d request vars like clonedReq.text()), without
    over-suppressing genuine misuse (response.text() still doesn't count).

  • scan fails loud on an unscannable target. A nonexistent / unreadable / non-file-or-dir path
    used to walk an empty tree → exit 0 "No findings" — a false all-clear for a CI security gate. It now
    exits 3 with error: cannot scan '<path>': …. (inventory, a listing command, stays graceful.)
    /dev/null and broken symlinks no longer leak an internal ENOTDIR baseline path.

  • --no-trivia / --no-update-notifier are now accepted. Both were documented in --help and
    consumed by scan but missing from the flag allowlist, so they were rejected as unknown flags.

  • file:line hyperlinks anchor correctly. Scanning a single file emitted a doubled-basename link
    (…/x.js/x.js:3:1); inventory resolved links against process.cwd() instead of the scan root.
    Both now anchor to the scan directory.

  • footer tally trims zero tiers. Found 2 critical · 0 high · 0 medium · 0 low · 0 info · 0 manual-review
    → Found 2 critical. Only non-zero severities show; manual-review shows only when present.

• ade4609: Cut real-app false positives from provider over-detection / mis-attribution (found scanning dub):

  • Generic HTTP headers no longer drive provider attribution. Postmark's catalog signature_header
    is authorization (its Basic-Auth scheme), but Authorization is read by nearly every
    authenticated route — so OAuth token endpoints, cron jobs, and admin routes were attributed to
    postmark and flagged as unverified postmark webhooks. A generic-header read (Authorization,
    Content-Type, …) is now recorded provider-agnostically; real postmark webhooks are still attributed
    by their specific signals (/postmark/* paths, SDK, POSTMARK_* env), and postmark's rules detect
    Basic-Auth via reachable symbols, not this header.

  • Stripe v2 verify calls recognized. stripe.parseThinEvent(...) (v2 API / thin events) and
    webhooks.constructEventAsync(...) (Edge/Workers async API) are now treated as signature
    verification, so correctly-verified v2 webhooks are no longer flagged
    stripe/missing-signature-verification.

  Combined with the req.text() raw-body fix, false-positive criticals on the dub codebase dropped
  from 20 to 9 (the remaining 9 are genuine unverified webhook routes plus two non-webhook routes that
  merely import the Stripe SDK — a separate over-detection class tracked for follow-up).

• c7f1046: Add Remix support. Remix action route modules under app/routes/** receive a Web Fetch API
  Request — identical to Next.js App Router — but were undetected, so a real Remix webhook scanned to
  0 handlers and silently reported "clean" (a false negative; found scanning documenso, whose Stripe
  webhook is apps/remix/app/routes/api+/stripe.webhook.ts). New remixAdapter detects action
  exports and derives the route from the remix-flat-routes filename (api+/stripe.webhook →
  /api/stripe/webhook); rules apply to remix via the nextjs equivalence in ruleAppliesToFramework
  (no per-rule YAML churn). remix added to the engine Framework union + the rules applies_to enum.

• 729c7a1: Stop flagging non-webhook routes that merely import a provider SDK (found scanning dub:
  billing/cancel, billing/payment-methods). Next.js App Router admits every route.ts POST
  regardless of path, so a route at a non-webhookish path whose only provider signal is import Stripe
  (used to call stripe.subscriptions.update, not to receive webhooks) was attributed to stripe and
  flagged stripe/missing-signature-verification — a false-positive critical. Such a route is
  statically indistinguishable from a real webhook, so it's now demoted to provider unknown (no
  provider rules fire), matching the engine's existing "ambiguous route → unknown → no finding" stance.
  A webhookish path (the canonical /webhook bug, whose only stripe signal is also the import) or any
  receiving signal (signature-header read, verify call, raw-body read, webhook secret, conventional
  path) keeps the attribution. Combined with the earlier raw-body / generic-header / parseThinEvent
  fixes, false-positive criticals on the dub codebase dropped from 20 to 7 (the 7 remaining are
  genuine unverified webhook routes).

• 1bd1791: Complete the Standard Webhooks detector with the hand-rolled prong (Clerk CVE-2025-53548) and fix a provider-attribution bug it surfaced.

  • STDWH-01 hand-rolled prong: a handler that re-implements the Standard Webhooks spec by hand — HMAC-SHA256 over the canonical {msg_id}.{timestamp}.{body} string — is now graded three ways. With no comparison reachable it is not-verified (the Clerk CVE-2025-53548 shape, where the signature is computed but never checked); with only an undecidable local compare wrapper (safeCompare() / verifySig()) it is manual-review; with a recognized constant-time compare it defers. Covers JS/TS (Babel), Python (tree-sitter), and PHP (tree-sitter source-walk). Plan 16 shipped only the library-import prong, so hand-rolled re-implementations were previously missed.
  • multi-signature-mishandled: a new rule for the v1,<sig1> v1,<sig2> rotation list — a manual-HMAC handler with no signature-iteration symbol reachable is manual-review (it likely breaks the moment a secret is rotated).
  • Provider-attribution fix: a correctly-verified hand-rolled handler (crypto.createHmac + crypto.timingSafeEqual) was mis-attributed to anthropic-agent-sdk and graded by the wrong provider's rules. Generic stdlib crypto primitives that some catalog entries list as VAS-01 suppression anchors no longer drive provider attribution; the VAS-01 suppression itself is unchanged.

  No whsec_ hardcoded-secret rule is added — the existing Stripe rule already matches it provider-agnostically. Engine purity preserved.