This release includes 2 security fixes for security teams reviewing exposed deployments.
Topics
+14 more
Affected surfaces
ReleasePort's take
Light signalToken exposure in grant listings is now masked and prompt injection execution is blocked (exit 1) unless the `--force` flag is used.
Why it matters: Masking full tokens prevents credential leakage; blocking prompt‑injection by default reduces risk of unauthorized command execution, with an override via `--force` for exceptional cases.
Summary
AI summaryToken exposure in grant listings is masked, prompt injection now blocks execution, and SkillSpector documentation clarifies capabilities.
Changes in this release
| Type | Severity | Summary | CVE |
|---|---|---|---|
| Security | Medium |
Token exposure in grant listings fixed; full tokens now masked. Token exposure in grant listings fixed; full tokens now masked. Source: llm_adapter@2026-05-24 Confidence: high |
— |
| Security | Medium |
Prompt injection now blocks execution; exit 1 when detected unless `--force` flag used. Prompt injection now blocks execution; exit 1 when detected unless `--force` flag used. Source: llm_adapter@2026-05-24 Confidence: high |
— |
| Feature | Medium |
Added machine‑readable `capabilities` block in SKILL.md listing filesystem, env_vars, shell_exec, tcp_port surfaces. Added machine‑readable `capabilities` block in SKILL.md listing filesystem, env_vars, shell_exec, tcp_port surfaces. Source: llm_adapter@2026-05-24 Confidence: low |
— |
| Feature | Medium |
Split `bundle_scope` and `network_calls` into structured sub‑fields for clarity. Split `bundle_scope` and `network_calls` into structured sub‑fields for clarity. Source: llm_adapter@2026-05-24 Confidence: low |
— |
| Feature | Medium |
Added explicit `DENY` conditions and scoping rules to `delegate_task` and `spawn_parallel_agents` in claude-tools.json. Added explicit `DENY` conditions and scoping rules to `delegate_task` and `spawn_parallel_agents` in claude-tools.json. Source: llm_adapter@2026-05-24 Confidence: low |
— |
| Feature | Medium |
Updated SECURITY.md and SKILL.md with warnings against using `auto_approve: true` in production. Updated SECURITY.md and SKILL.md with warnings against using `auto_approve: true` in production. Source: llm_adapter@2026-05-24 Confidence: low |
— |
| Feature | Medium |
Documented that justification fields are stored verbatim and must not contain PII, credentials, or secrets in SECURITY.md. Documented that justification fields are stored verbatim and must not contain PII, credentials, or secrets in SECURITY.md. Source: llm_adapter@2026-05-24 Confidence: low |
— |
Full changelog
Network-AI v5.8.2 — Security & SkillSpector fixes
This patch resolves 8 findings from the ClawHub SkillSpector v5.8.1 scan, including two security fixes.
Security fixes
Token exposure in grant listings (Ssd3, 98% confidence)
scripts/check_permission.py --active-grants --json previously included a token_full field with the live grant token in every listing entry. Full tokens are now only shown at issuance time. All listing output uses the masked prefix (token[:16] + "...") only. The script header now includes an explicit warning that justification strings are logged verbatim to data/audit_log.jsonl and must not contain PII, credentials, or secrets.
Prompt injection not blocked in context_manager.py (Missing User Warnings, 93% confidence)
context_manager.py inject previously warned to stderr about detected prompt-injection patterns in data/project-context.json but still proceeded to emit the context block. Injection is now blocked (exit 1) when _validate_context() returns warnings. A new --force flag allows operators to override in explicitly trusted/CI environments. This prevents adversarially-crafted context entries from persisting across agent sessions.
Metadata / documentation fixes
- SKILL.md — explicit capabilities manifest (Lp3, 90%): Added a machine-readable
capabilitiesblock undermetadata.openclawdeclaringfilesystem,env_vars,shell_exec, andtcp_portsurfaces, scope, and conditions. - SKILL.md — scope ambiguity resolved (Mismatch Medium/High, 92%/89%):
bundle_scopeandnetwork_callssplit from single prose strings into structured sub-fields:clawhub_python_scripts(local-only, zero network) vsnpm_full_package(TypeScript library + CLI + optional MCP SSE server). Operators can now unambiguously determine what ClawHub ships vs whatnpm installdelivers. - claude-tools.json — vague trigger conditions (Vague Triggers, 83%): Added explicit
DENYconditions and scoping rules todelegate_taskandspawn_parallel_agentsdescribing when the tools must not be invoked. - SECURITY.md — auto-approve warning (Excessive Agency, 78%):
ApprovalGateentry updated to explicitly warn thatauto_approve: trueis only appropriate in isolated CI/dev sandboxes and must never be used in production. Also added toSKILL.mdprivacy.auto_approve_warning. - SECURITY.md — justification field sensitivity (Ssd3, 94%):
SecureAuditLoggertable entry now documents that justification fields are stored verbatim and must not contain PII, credentials, or secrets.
Files changed
scripts/check_permission.py, scripts/context_manager.py, SKILL.md, claude-tools.json, SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, CHANGELOG.md, package.json, skill.json, openapi.yaml, README.md, and all version-bearing doc files.
Security Fixes
- Token exposure: Full token removed from grant listings; only masked prefix shown (`token[:16] + "..."`). Header warns audit_log.jsonl logs justification strings verbatim.
- Prompt injection: `context_manager.py inject` now exits with code 1 on detected patterns and blocks context emission. Added `--force` flag for CI/trusted environments.
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About Jovancoding/Network-AI
Multi-agent orchestration MCP server with race-condition-safe shared blackboard. 20+ MCP tools: blackboard read/write, agent spawn/stop, FSM transitions, budget tracking, token management, and audit log query. `npx network-ai-server --port 3001`.
Related context
Beta — feedback welcome: [email protected]