This release includes 2 security fixes for security teams reviewing exposed deployments.
Topics
+4 more
Affected surfaces
Summary
AI summaryHook authentication now enforced in all modes and gateway settings remain token‑gated under trusted proxy, fixing a bypass introduced in v0.16.0.
Full changelog
0.16.0's loopback power gates assumed someone saw the daemon print its credentialed link. On auto-started daemons — Coder workspaces, systemd services, hook-spawned daemons — that line goes to a log file, and users hit a locked board with no key in sight. This release makes the key findable everywhere, makes the gates optional where they defend nothing, and closes a hook-auth bypass the 0.16.0 docs had wrongly guaranteed against.
Added
FLEETDECK_TRUST_LOOPBACK=onwaives the four loopback power gates (/ws/term,POST /mail,gateway_*settings writes, the unsupervised arm) for plain-loopback callers — the pre-0.16.0 behavior, opted into explicitly. Keys off the real peer address, not a header. Startup-fatal combined with LAN bind orFLEETDECK_REQUIRE_TOKEN. Does not waive hook auth. For single-user machines and port-forwarded Coder workspaces where no other OS user can reach127.0.0.1.docs/CODER.mdcarries both recipes.- The key is findable after auto-start. The SessionStart brief names where the key lives (
fleetdeck token/$FLEETDECK_HOME/token);fleetdeck statusshows the board URL and points atfleetdeck token; the board key gate explains recovery.fleetdeck statuskeeps the credentialed link out of routine output so it can't leak into logs/scrollback — pass--show-tokento copy the full?t=URL.
Security
gateway_*settings writes stay token-gated even underFLEETDECK_PROXY_AUTH=trust. They reroute every future session's LLM traffic and can exfiltrate the gateway credential; the trusted-proxy signal is derived from caller-controlledHost/Origina direct-loopback process can forge. Only the explicitFLEETDECK_TRUST_LOOPBACK=onopt-out (real-peer keyed) waives them.- Hooks authenticate in every mode, including
FLEETDECK_PROXY_AUTH=trust. 0.16.0 gated/hook/*on the bearer, but the proxy-trust exemption inauthorized()returned before that gate: a direct-loopback process could forge the configured trustedHost/Originand POST tokenless hooks on a trust-mode daemon, re-opening the session-impersonation forgeries 0.16.0 closed. The/hook/*gate now leadsauthorized(), ahead of every loopback and proxy-trust exemption. Regression coverage added (forged headers,TRUST_LOOPBACKon and off).
Full changelog: https://github.com/lacion/fleet-deck/blob/v0.16.1/CHANGELOG.md
Security Fixes
- Hooks now authenticate in every mode, including `FLEETDECK_PROXY_AUTH=trust`, closing an impersonation bypass where a loopback process could POST tokenless hooks.
- `gateway_*` settings writes stay token‑gated even when `FLEETDECK_PROXY_AUTH=trust` is set, preventing exfiltration of gateway credentials via forged headers.
Weekly OSS security release digest.
The CVE patches and breaking changes that affected production tools this week. One email, every Sunday.
No spam, unsubscribe anytime.
Share this release
About Fleet Deck
All releases →Related context
Related tools
Beta — feedback welcome: [email protected]