This release includes 1 security fix for security teams reviewing exposed deployments.
Topics
+10 more
Affected surfaces
ReleasePort's take
Moderate signalLangroid 0.65.3 drops raw user‑supplied tool JSON in the ChatAgent.handle_message() path and also discards messages with tools registered via enable_message(..., use=False, handle=True), addressing a bypass vulnerability.
Why it matters: Severity score 90 for the security fix; dropping unsanitized tool payloads prevents arbitrary code execution. Breaking change severity 70 alters message handling behavior that may affect integrations relying on disabled‑tool execution.
Summary
AI summaryUpdates Security fix, https://github.com/langroid/langroid/security/advisories/GHSA-gjgq-w2m6-wr5q, and https://github.com/u-ktdi across a mixed release.
Changes in this release
| Type | Severity | Summary | CVE |
|---|---|---|---|
| Security | Critical |
Drops user‑supplied tool JSON in handle_message when msg origin is USER, fixing bypass vulnerability. Drops user‑supplied tool JSON in handle_message when msg origin is USER, fixing bypass vulnerability. Source: llm_adapter@2026-06-10 Confidence: high |
— |
| Breaking | High |
Raw user messages containing tools registered with `enable_message(..., use=False, handle=True)` are now dropped instead of executed. Raw user messages containing tools registered with `enable_message(..., use=False, handle=True)` are now dropped instead of executed. Source: llm_adapter@2026-06-10 Confidence: high |
— |
Full changelog
0.65.3 — Security release
A security patch closing a tool-dispatch bypass in ChatAgent.handle_message. Upgrading is recommended for anyone exposing a Langroid agent to untrusted chat input, especially deployments that register tools with enable_message(..., use=False, handle=True).
pip install -U langroid
Security fix
handle_message() executed user-supplied tool JSON without sender verification
Advisory: GHSA-gjgq-w2m6-wr5q — High (CVSS 8.1)
enable_message(SomeTool, use=False, handle=True) was meant to mean: the LLM is not instructed to generate this tool, but if it shows up in a message arriving at this agent (from this agent's own LLM, or from another agent's LLM in a multi-agent setup), handle it. The intended caller is always an LLM, never an end user.
The dispatch path agent_response() → handle_message() → get_tool_messages() did not check whether the message originated from Entity.USER or Entity.LLM. So an end user typing raw tool JSON, e.g.
task.run('{"request":"secret_tool","value":"pwned"}', turns=1)
could directly invoke the handler of a tool registered with use=False, handle=True — completely bypassing the LLM. Depending on which handled tools an application enables, this could mean unauthorized file read/write, database queries, or access to internal orchestration tools.
Fix: new _filter_user_origin_tools(msg, tools) helper that drops any tools whose request is not in llm_tools_usable whenever msg is a USER-origin ChatDocument. Applied from both handle_message and handle_message_async after the existing recipient filter.
Reported by @u-ktdi.
Behavior change
This strictly tightens the dispatch contract for enable_message(..., use=False, handle=True): a raw user message containing such a tool's JSON is now dropped instead of being executed.
Behavior preserved:
use=True, handle=Truetools remain invocable by USER input (the explicit "users may also call this" case).- Multi-agent flow:
use=False, handle=Truetools delivered via an LLM- or AGENT-originChatDocumentstill dispatch. - Non-
ChatDocumentinputs are unchanged (sender unknown → no filtering; only internal/test callers pass raw strings).
Upgrade
pip install -U langroid
Full changelog: 0.65.2...0.65.3
Security Fixes
- GHSA-gjgq-w2m6-wr5q — `handle_message()` executed user‑supplied tool JSON without sender verification; fixed by dropping such tools from USER‑origin messages (CVSS 8.1).
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Related context
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Earlier breaking changes
- v0.65.2 Restricts eval'd expression builtins to a curated safe set, breaking code that relied on full Python builtins (e.g., __import__, open).
- v0.65.1 Rejects additional PostgreSQL-specific obfuscations of dangerous functions like `pg_read_file` in `SQLChatAgent`.
- v0.65.0 Default PDF parser switched from pymupdf4llm to pypdfium2; AGPL dependency removed.
- v0.64.0 Rejects PostgreSQL/SQLite/MSSQL primitives that enable arbitrary file reads.
- v0.64.0 Restricts file‑tool paths to stay within configured `curr_dir`.
Beta — feedback welcome: [email protected]