s-b-e-n-s-o-n/portkey-admin-mcp

Security-hardening release. Remediates all eight findings (two high, four medium, two low) from the 2026-07-20 best-practices review; each fix ships with regression tests or configuration assertions. See security_best_practices_report.md for the full evidence and verification log. No Portkey Admin API tool surface changes — the 156-tool inventory is unchanged.

Several changes are breaking for HTTP/hosted deployments and require operator action:

• Production Redis (MCP_EVENT_STORE=redis / RATE_LIMIT_STORE=redis) now requires a rediss:// URL on non-loopback hosts.
• Redis replay now requires MCP_EVENT_ENCRYPTION_KEY (base64 32-byte AES key; generate with openssl rand -base64 32).
• Clerk mode now requires at least one authorization policy (CLERK_ALLOWED_SUBJECTS, CLERK_ALLOWED_ORGANIZATION_IDS, CLERK_ALLOWED_ROLES, or CLERK_REQUIRED_PERMISSIONS); a valid JWT alone is no longer sufficient.
• Production HTTP must choose a rate-limit topology explicitly: RATE_LIMIT_STORE=redis, or RATE_LIMIT_SINGLE_PROCESS=true for a single long-lived process.
• Outbound Portkey calls are HTTPS-only by default; a plaintext self-hosted gateway now needs PORTKEY_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP=true in addition to PORTKEY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_BASE_URL.
• MCP_EVENT_TTL_SECONDS default drops from 3600 to 300.

Security

• SEC-001 (High): PORTKEY_TOOL_DOMAINS/MCP_TOOL_DOMAINS is now a hard server-side allowlist. The HTTP ?tools= query can only narrow it; a requested domain outside the configured set is rejected instead of silently overriding it, closing an authorization bypass where a caller could re-enable excluded key/user/secret mutation tools.
• SEC-002 (High): Clerk mode now authorizes the verified subject rather than granting the shared PORTKEY_API_KEY to any valid token. It requires at least one explicit subject/organization/role/permission policy, evaluates every configured constraint, and attaches a normalized principal to the request. Breaking: existing Clerk deployments must add a policy.
• SEC-003 (Medium): Sessions, in-memory and Redis replay events, per-stream leases, and replay cursors are bound to an opaque principal digest and equality-checked on every POST/GET/DELETE/replay. Raw session and event IDs are no longer logged; logs use capability fingerprints.
• SEC-004 (Medium): Credentialed Portkey requests use redirect: "manual" so x-portkey-api-key can never follow a redirect to another origin, and default to HTTPS. Breaking: plaintext private gateways require the new PORTKEY_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP=true opt-in alongside PORTKEY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_BASE_URL.
• SEC-005 (Medium): Redis replay payloads are encrypted with AES-256-GCM using MCP_EVENT_ENCRYPTION_KEY, non-loopback production Redis requires rediss://, events carry an enforced owner, and default retention drops to 300 seconds. Breaking: redis:// in production and a missing encryption key are now rejected.
• SEC-006 (Medium): Renovate enforces a repository-wide seven-day minimum release age and no longer automerges lockfile maintenance or devDependency updates. The release pipeline packages the tarball in a non-OIDC job and publishes only that verified artifact.
• SEC-007 (Low): Added a distributed rate limiter — an atomic pre-authentication bucket keyed by normalized trusted IP and a post-authentication bucket keyed by principal plus IP, both Redis-backed and IPv6-subnet-normalized. Breaking: production must set RATE_LIMIT_STORE=redis or RATE_LIMIT_SINGLE_PROCESS=true; the process-local limiter remains only as defense in depth.
• SEC-008 (Low): The runtime container removes npm, npx, and npm's global module tree after installing production dependencies, dropping the bundled tar/undici advisories from the image.

Added

• PORTKEY_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP, MCP_EVENT_ENCRYPTION_KEY, RATE_LIMIT_STORE, RATE_LIMIT_SINGLE_PROCESS, RATE_LIMIT_REDIS_URL, RATE_LIMIT_REDIS_KEY_PREFIX, and the Clerk authorization variables (CLERK_ALLOWED_SUBJECTS, CLERK_ALLOWED_ORGANIZATION_IDS, CLERK_ALLOWED_ROLES, CLERK_REQUIRED_PERMISSIONS) — documented in the README env-var table, .env.example, and docs/VERCEL_DEPLOYMENT.md.
• express-rate-limit (8.x) promoted to a direct dependency for the defense-in-depth Express limiter.
• security_best_practices_report.md — the full remediation report with per-finding evidence, mitigations, and the verification matrix (npm audit, Trivy, Gitleaks, Semgrep, Zizmor, Actionlint, live Redis integration).

Changed

• MCP_EVENT_TTL_SECONDS default 3600 → 300, shortening the window in which replay data lives at rest.
• RATE_LIMIT_MAX_BUCKETS now applies only in explicit memory mode.
• The Vercel guide, .env.example, and Dockerfile document the required rediss://, replay encryption key, and explicit rate-limit topology for production.

What's Changed

• chore(deps): pin dependencies by @renovate[bot] in https://github.com/CodesWhat/portkey-admin-mcp/pull/18
• chore(deps): lock file maintenance by @renovate[bot] in https://github.com/CodesWhat/portkey-admin-mcp/pull/20
• 🔧 config(renovate): automerge lockfile maintenance and non-major devDeps by @scttbnsn in https://github.com/CodesWhat/portkey-admin-mcp/pull/23
• 🔒 Security hardening + v0.6.0 release by @scttbnsn in https://github.com/CodesWhat/portkey-admin-mcp/pull/25

New Contributors

• @renovate[bot] made their first contribution in https://github.com/CodesWhat/portkey-admin-mcp/pull/18

Full Changelog: https://github.com/CodesWhat/portkey-admin-mcp/compare/v0.5.0...v0.6.0